Toronto Networking Seminar

Models and Games for Data Dissemination in Peer-to-Peer Systems

George Kesidis
Pennsylvania State University

Date:  Friday, January  5,  2pm
Location: BA 1200 


We begin with an overview of incentive systems for cooperation in peer-to-peer file distribution including those that are: based on monetary exchange, based on cumulative reputations, and rule-based. Incentives work for both the process of query resolution (via structured, unstructured or hybrid systems) and for the exchange of data itself. For data-exchange, we will formulate a game involving provably incentive-compatible cumulative reputation systems and uplink-bandwidth control. An epidemiological (coagulation) model for BitTorrent swarms will also be described. Finally, I will conclude with a brief description of epidemiological modeling of the Slammer worm and discuss the quarantined DETER testbed based on Emulab.


George Kesidis received his M.S. and Ph.D. in EECS from U.C. Berkeley in 1990 and 1992 respectively.  He was a professor in the E&CE Dept of the University of Waterloo, Canada, from 1992 to 2000. Since April 2000, he has taught in both the CS&E and EE Depts of the Pennsylvania State University. His research experience spans  several areas of computer/communication networking including security, incentive engineering, efficient simulation, and traffic engineering.  Currently, he a senior member of the IEEE and the TPC co-chair of IEEE INFOCOM 2007.