and Games for Data Dissemination in Peer-to-Peer Systems
Friday, January 5, 2pm
Location: BA 1200
We begin with an overview of incentive systems for cooperation in
peer-to-peer file distribution including those that are: based on
monetary exchange, based on cumulative reputations, and rule-based.
Incentives work for both the process of query resolution (via
structured, unstructured or hybrid systems) and for the exchange of
data itself. For data-exchange, we will formulate a game involving
provably incentive-compatible cumulative reputation systems and
uplink-bandwidth control. An epidemiological (coagulation) model for
BitTorrent swarms will also be described. Finally, I will conclude with
a brief description of epidemiological modeling of the Slammer worm and
discuss the quarantined DETER testbed based on Emulab.
Kesidis received his M.S. and Ph.D. in EECS from U.C. Berkeley in 1990
and 1992 respectively. He was a professor in the E&CE
Dept of the University of Waterloo, Canada, from 1992 to 2000. Since
April 2000, he has taught in both the CS&E and EE Depts of the
Pennsylvania State University. His research experience spans
several areas of computer/communication networking including security,
incentive engineering, efficient simulation, and traffic
engineering. Currently, he a senior member of the IEEE and
the TPC co-chair of IEEE INFOCOM 2007.