Toronto
Networking Seminar



      
      




      
      

      
      
Disruption Tolerant Networks: Capacity Building and Robustness
      



      
      
Mark Corner

      



      Department of Computer Science



University of Massachusetts, Amherst



      
      
      
Date: 
Friday, October 20,  3pm 



Location: BA1170 (Bahen Center)



      
      



      
      
Abstract:



      



      
Disruption Tolerant Networks rely on intermittent contacts between
mobile
nodes to deliver packets using a store-carry-and-forward paradigm. In
this
talk, I will present a few results from a UMass-GaTach collaboration to
study Disruption Tolerant Networks. We have recently constructed a
large-scale DTN, called UMassDieselNet, that runs on a network of 40
busses
covering a 120 square mile area. While a number of projects have
emerged
from this testbed, I will focus on capacity building and robustness.
The performance of DTNs can be improved through careful capacity
building.
We propose the use of throwbox nodes, which are stationary, battery
powered
nodes with storage and processing, to enhance the capacity of DTNs.
However,
the use of throwboxes without efficient power management is minimally
effective. If the nodes are too liberal with their energy consumption,
they
will fail prematurely. However if they are too conservative, they may
miss
important transfer opportunities, hence increasing lifetime without
improving performance. I will present a hardware and software
architecture
for energy efficient throwboxes in DTNs. We propose a hardware platform
that
uses a multi-tiered, multi-radio, scalable, solar powered platform.
Through
trace-driven simulations and prototype deployment we show that a single
throwbox with a small-sized solar panel can run perpetually while
improving
packet delivery by 37% and reducing message delivery latency by at
least 10%
in the network.
If time permits, I will also cover our recent efforts in measuring the
robustness of DTNs to attack. Just as in traditional networks,
malicious
nodes within a DTN may attempt to delay or destroy data in transit to
its
destination. Such attacks include dropping data, flooding the network
with
extra messages, corrupting routing tables, and counterfeiting network
acknowledgments. We conclude that Disruption Tolerant Networks are
extremely
robust to attack; in our trace-driven evaluations, an attacker that has
compromised 30% of all nodes reduces throughput by only 15% and up to
50%
with knowledge of future events.
      
      
      
Bio:



      



      Mark
Corner has been an Assistant Professor in the Computer Science
Department at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst since 2003 after
graduating with his PhD in Electrical Engineering from the University
of
Michigan. His primary interests lie in the areas of mobile and
pervasive
computing, networking, file systems and security. He was the recipient
of
an NSF CAREER award in 2005, a Best Paper Award at ACM Multimedia 2005,
as
well as the Best Student Paper Award at Mobicom 2002. Prof. Corner's
work
is supported by the NSF, DARPA, and the NSA.