Disruption Tolerant Networks: Capacity Building and Robustness
Department of Computer Science
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Friday, October 20, 3pm
Location: BA1170 (Bahen Center)
Disruption Tolerant Networks rely on intermittent contacts between
nodes to deliver packets using a store-carry-and-forward paradigm. In
talk, I will present a few results from a UMass-GaTach collaboration to
study Disruption Tolerant Networks. We have recently constructed a
large-scale DTN, called UMassDieselNet, that runs on a network of 40
covering a 120 square mile area. While a number of projects have
from this testbed, I will focus on capacity building and robustness.
The performance of DTNs can be improved through careful capacity
We propose the use of throwbox nodes, which are stationary, battery
nodes with storage and processing, to enhance the capacity of DTNs.
the use of throwboxes without efficient power management is minimally
effective. If the nodes are too liberal with their energy consumption,
will fail prematurely. However if they are too conservative, they may
important transfer opportunities, hence increasing lifetime without
improving performance. I will present a hardware and software
for energy efficient throwboxes in DTNs. We propose a hardware platform
uses a multi-tiered, multi-radio, scalable, solar powered platform.
trace-driven simulations and prototype deployment we show that a single
throwbox with a small-sized solar panel can run perpetually while
packet delivery by 37% and reducing message delivery latency by at
in the network.
If time permits, I will also cover our recent efforts in measuring the
robustness of DTNs to attack. Just as in traditional networks,
nodes within a DTN may attempt to delay or destroy data in transit to
destination. Such attacks include dropping data, flooding the network
extra messages, corrupting routing tables, and counterfeiting network
acknowledgments. We conclude that Disruption Tolerant Networks are
robust to attack; in our trace-driven evaluations, an attacker that has
compromised 30% of all nodes reduces throughput by only 15% and up to
with knowledge of future events.
Corner has been an Assistant Professor in the Computer Science
Department at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst since 2003 after
graduating with his PhD in Electrical Engineering from the University
Michigan. His primary interests lie in the areas of mobile and
computing, networking, file systems and security. He was the recipient
an NSF CAREER award in 2005, a Best Paper Award at ACM Multimedia 2005,
well as the Best Student Paper Award at Mobicom 2002. Prof. Corner's
is supported by the NSF, DARPA, and the NSA.