Secure or Insure? A Game
Theoretic Analysis of Information
Security Games
Nicolas Christin
Information Networking Institute
Carnegie Mellon University
Date: Friday, October 16, 2pm
Location: BA 1210
Abstract:
Security interactions in
networked systems, and the associated user choices, due to their complexity,
are notoriously difficult to predict, and sometimes even harder to
rationalize. We argue that users often underestimate the strong mutual
dependence between their security strategies and the economic environment
(e.g., threat model) in which these choices are made and evaluated. This
misunderstanding weakens the effectiveness of users' security investments. We
study how economic agents invest into security in different economic
environments, which are characteristic of different threat models. We notably
explore Nash equilibrium predictions for the environments considered, and
contrast them with social optima. We further discuss the effect of relaxing
assumptions on the amount of information available to users before they make a
decision.
(Joint work with Jens Grossklags and Benjamin Johnson).
Bio:
Nicolas
Christin is the Associate Director of the Information Networking Institute at
Carnegie Mellon University, where he also serves as a faculty member. He is in
addition a CyLab Systems Scientist, and (by courtesy) a faculty member in the
Electrical and Computer Engineering department. He holds a Diplôme d'Ingénieur
from École Centrale Lille, and M.S. and Ph.D. degrees in Computer Science from
the University of Virginia. While in graduate school, he worked at Nortel's
Advanced Technology Lab. Before joining Carnegie Mellon in 2005, he was a
post-doctoral researcher in the School of Information at the University of
California, Berkeley. He served for three years as resident faculty in the CyLab
Japan program in Kobe (Japan), before returning to Carnegie Mellon's main campus
in 2008. His research interests are in computer and information systems
networks; most of his work is at the boundary of systems and policy research,
with a slant toward security aspects. He has most recently focused on network
security and its economics, incentive-compatible network topology design, and
peer-to-peer security.
Host of the talk
Jörg Liebeherr (jorg@comm.toronto.edu)