4 December 2016 - Washington, DC USA
|9:00 - 10:10||Keynote||Title: Cyber Security of Smart Grids: A Case for a Schizoid Design Approach
Speaker: Dr. Sandeep Shula (IIT Kanpur)
|10:10 - 10:30||Cyber-Physical Security||- Cascading Node Failure with Continuous States in Random Geometric Networks|
|10:30 - 11:00||Break|
|11:00 - 12:20||Cyber-Physical Resilience||
- Detecting Peer-to-Peer Botnets in SCADA Systems
- Dynamics and Steady-State Behavior of Self-Healing Cyber-Physical Networks in Light of Cyber-Node Delays
- On the Impact of Wireless Jamming on the Distributed Secondary Microgrid Control
- Implementation of an Offline Co-Simulation Test-bed for Cyber Security and Control Verification
In the past, the design of cyber physical systems (CPS) required a model based engineering approach -- a design methodology consisting of physics based mathematical modeling of the physical system, and a control theoretic modeling of the control system put together in a formal or semi-formal framework. The designers would start from an abstract model, and refine it down to an implementation model in several steps, either formally or informally. The implementation model is then validated for functional correctness, and satisfaction of performance, real-time schedulability goals. Functional Safety, robustness to input assumptions, reliability under fault assumptions, and resilience to unknown adversities were considered as important design goals for safety-critical CPS.
With the increased use of networked distributed control of large and geographically distributed critical infrastructures such as smart grid and the exposure to cyber-attacks ushered in by the IP-convergence phenomenon -- designers must now consider cyber-security and cyber defense as first class design objectives. However, in order to do so, designers have to don a dual personality -- while designing for robustness, reliability, functional safety -- a model driven engineering approach would work -- for designing for cyber-security and defense, the designer has to enter the mindset of a malicious attacker. For instance, one has to consider the various observations or sampling points of the system (e.g. sensors to read or sample the physical environment), and think how an attacker might compromise the unobservability of those points without authentication, and what knowledge of the system dynamics or the control mechanism of the system might be actually reconstructed by the attacker. One also has to consider the actuation points of the system, and ponder the least number of such actuation points the attacker has to take over in order to disrupt the dynamics of the system enough to create considerable damage. One has to envision how to obfuscate the dynamics of the system even when certain sensing or actuation points are compromised. Also, it is known that a large percentage of attacks are induced by insider or a collusion of internal and external agents.
Thus perimeter defense alone cannot defend the system. In such cases, the symptoms of an ongoing attack in the dynamics of the system itself has to be discerned continually. This approach to viewing the system from an adversarial position requires us to topple the design paradigm over its head, and we will need to build models from data, and not just generate data from models. The designer has to observe a system in action – even through partial observations, and construct a model close enough to the real system model – and then use the partial access to create damages to the because the approximate model allows her to do so. Almost like a schizophrenic duality, the engineer also has to wear the designers hat, and consider a game in which the observations are obfuscated enough to render it impossible for an attacker to build any useful model to induce clever attacks. The designer has to worry if she can construct from unobfuscated observations a dynamics quickly enough so that the difference between the expected dynamics and the real dynamics can trigger alarms to alert the system administrators.
In this talk, while discussing this view of system design, we will also talk about VSCADA -- a virtual distributed SCADA lab we created for modeling SCADA systems for critical infrastructures, and how to use such a virtual lab completely implemented in simulation -- to achieve the cyber security and cyber defense objectives of critical infrastructures -- through attack injections, attack detection, and experiments on new defense mechanisms. We will also discuss the real SCADA test bed we are building at our center for cyber security of critical infrastructures at IIT Kanpur.
Professor Sandeep K. Shukla is an IEEE fellow, an ACM Distinguished Scientist, and served as an IEEE Computer Society Distinguished Visitor during 2008-2012, and as an ACM Distinguished Speaker during 2007-2014. He is currently the Editor-in-Chief of ACM Transactions on Embedded Systems, and associate editor for ACM transactions on Cyber Physical Systems. In the past, he has been associate editors for IEEE Transactions on Computers, IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics, IEEE Design & Test, IEEE Embedded Systems Letters, and many other journals. He has guest-edited more than 15 special issues for various IEEE and ACM journals. He has written or edited 9 books, published over 200 journal and conference papers. He has been program chairs for 4 IEEE/ACM International conferences, and General Chair for 2 of these conferences. He has served on the program committee of more than 100 international conferences and workshops. He supervised 12 PhDs, and directed five post-doctoral scholars at Virginia Tech. Sandeep's current research focus is on Cyber Security for Critical Infrastructures. He is coordinating a research center on cyber security for critical infrastructures along with his colleagues at IIT Kanpur at the moment.
He received his bachelor’s degree in Computer Science and Engineering at Jadavpur University, Kolkata in 1991, his Masters and PhD degrees in Computer Science from the State University of New York at Albany, NY, USA in 1995 and 1997 respectively. He worked as a scientist at the GTE labs on telecommunications network management, distributed object technology, and event correlation technologies between 1997 and 1999. Between 1999 and 2001, he worked at the Intel Corporation on the formal verification of the ITANIUM processor, and on system level design languages. 2001-2002, he was a research faculty at the University of California at Irvine working on embedded system design. From 2002 till 2015, he has been an assistant, associate, and full professor at Virginia Tech, USA. He co-founded the Center for Embedded Systems for Critical Applications (CESCA) in 2007, and has been a director of the center between 2010 and 2012. In 2015, he joined the Computer Science and Engineering Department of the Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur, India. He is currently the Poonam and Prabhu Goel Chair Professor, and Dr.Deep Singh and Daljeet Kaur Faculty Fellow at IIT Kanpur.
He received the Ramanujan Fellowship from the Science and Engineering Research Board, Government of India, the Presidential Early Career Award for Scientists and Engineers (PECASE) from the White House in 2004, Frederich Wilhelm Bessel Award in 2008 from the Humboldt Foundation, Germany, Virginia Tech Faculty Fellow Award, A distinguished Alumni Award from the State University of New York at Albany, A best paper award at the Asia-Pacific Design Automation Conference, GTE Laboratories Excellence Award,ASEE/ONR Faculty Fellowship in 2005, ASEE/Air Force Senior Faculty Fellowship in 2007, and an Air Force Labs Faculty Fellowship in 2008. Sandeep also has been a visiting faculty at INRIA, France, University of Kaiserslautern in Germany, MIT, and University of Birmingham UK for various periods of time.
The smart grid promises increased capacity, reliability and security through the marriage of information technology with the electric power grid. While this integration enables new opportunities, it also creates a host of unfamiliar vulnerabilities stemming from cyber intrusion and corruption potentially leading to devastating physical effects. The security of a system is as strong as its weakest link. Thus, the scale and complexity of the smart grid, along with its increased connectivity and automation make the task of cyber protection particularly challenging.
Cyber-physical security is an emerging field focusing on attacks that target the cyber and physical system components of the smart grid including phasor measurement units, intelligent electronic devices, communication links, control systems and metering devices with the ultimate goal of disrupting physical components such as generators or transmission lines. Such attacks can lead to cascading failures that also affect power flow, but employ diverse threat and attacker capability models.
This workshop focuses on cyber-physical techniques for secure and resilient energy system design and operation. Understanding the cyber-physical trade-offs necessary in designing secure and resilient energy systems is essential for system operation.
Smart grids are undergoing a rapid technological, economic and environmental evolution. The marriage of information and communication technologies with traditional energy production, delivery and distribution systems, aims to create more reliable, efficient, environmentally-friendly and consumer-centric energy systems. However, this increased dependence on information technology heightens system vulnerabilities to include those of its cyber-enabled components. The high degree of complexity, connectedness and collaboration of emerging energy systems makes comprehensive identification of weaknesses challenging. To help secure future energy systems, approaches to protect and enhance resilience during both system design and operations are critical.
This workshop addresses issues of cyber-physical smart grid security and resilient energy system design and operation. Emphasis is placed on efficient strategies that harness communication networking, computation and/or control to improve security and resilience through increased adaptability, reliability and functionality.
Topics of interest include (but are not limited to):
Prospective authors are invited to submit full-length papers to this workshop. The submissions should present original theoretical and/or experimental research in any of the areas listed above that has not been published, accepted for publication, or under review by another conference or journal.
All submissions should be written in English with a maximum paper length of six (6) printed pages (10-point font) in IEEE double-column format. The submissions must be in PDF format with all fonts embedded, and be formatted according to the IEEE Proceedings format. Papers that do not meet the size and formatting requirements will not be accepted. The accepted papers will be published as part of the GLOBECOM proceedings at the IEEE Explore.
Please make sure to follow the Author and Submission Guidelines for submissions.
Standard IEEE conference templates are found here.
Submissions must be done through EDAS.
The Edward S. Rogers Sr. Department of Electrical & Computer Engineering
University of Toronto
Technical Program Chairs:
Department of Electrical & Computer Engineering
University of California, Riverside
Hydro-Québec Research Institute (IREQ)
The Edward S. Rogers Sr. Department of Electrical & Computer Engineering
University of Toronto
Technical Program Committee:
Arash Mohammadi, Concordia University
Dariush Fooladivanda, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Usman Khan, Tufts University
Apurva Narayan, University of Waterloo
Ana Goulart, Texas A&M University
Islam Safak Bayram, Hamad Bin Khalifa University
Hossein Akhavan-Hejazi, University of California, Riverside
Miao He, Texas Tech University
Zubair Fadlullah, Tohoku University
Melike Erol-Kantarci, Clarkson University
Chadi Assi, Concordia University
Saman Zonouz, Rutgers University
Hany Farag, York University
Robin Berthier, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Mourad Debbabi, Concordia University
Soummya Kar, Carnegie Mellon University
Rakesh Bobba, Oregon State University
John Simpson-Porco, University of Waterloo
Kaamran Raahemifar, Ryerson University