

# Secret-Key Generation from Channel Reciprocity: A Separation Approach

Ashish Khisti


Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering  
University of Toronto

Feb 11, 2013

# Security at PHY-Layer

Use PHY Resources for designing security mechanisms.

<b>Application Layer</b> (Semantics of Information)
<b>Transport Layer</b> (End to End Connectivity)
<b>Network Layer</b> (Routing and Path Discovery)
<b>Data Link Layer</b> (Error Correction Codes)
<b>Physical Layer</b> (Signals, RF hardware)





## Applications:

- [Secret-Key Generation](#)
- Secure Message Transmission
- Physical Layer Authentication
- Jamming Resistance

# Motivation

## Secret-Key Generation in Wireless Fading Channels



**Fading:**

$$y_B(t) = h_{AB}(t)x_A(t) + n_B(t)$$


**Reciprocity:**

$$y_B(t) = h_{AB}(t)x_A(t) + n_B(t)$$

$$y_A(t) = h_{BA}(t)x_B(t) + n_A(t)$$

# Motivation

## Secret-Key Generation in Wireless Fading Channels



### Spatial Decorrelation:

$$y_B(t) = h_{AB}(t)x_A(t) + n_B(t)$$

$$y_A(t) = h_{BA}(t)x_B(t) + n_A(t)$$

$$z_A(t) = g_A(t)x_A(t) + n_{AE}(t)$$

$$z_B(t) = g_B(t)x_B(t) + n_{BE}(t)$$

# Secret-Key Generation - A Systems Approach

## *Key Generation in Wireless Systems*

- **UWB Systems:** Wilson-Tse-Scholz ('07), M. Ko ('07), Madiseh-Neville-McGuire('12)
- **Narrowband Systems:** Azimi Sadjadi- Kiayias-Mercado-Yener ('07), Mathur-Trappe-Mandayam -Ye-Reznick ('10), Patware and Kasera ('07)
- **OFDM reciprocity:** Haile ('09), Tsouri and Wulich ('09)

## *Implementations*

- **Experimental UWB:** Measurements for Key Generation Madiseh ('12)
- **Software Radio Implementations:** Jana et. al. ('09)
- **MIMO systems:** Wallace and Sharma ('10), Shimizu et al. Zeng-Wu-Mohapatra



## *Signal Processing for Secret-Key Generation*

- **Quantization Techniques:** Ye-Reznick-Shah ('07), Hamida-Pierrot-Castelluccia ('09), Sun-Zhu-Jiang-Zhao ('11)
- **Adaptive Channel Probing:** Wei-Zheng-Mohapatra ('10)
- **Mobility Assisted Key Generation:** Gungor-Chen-Koksal ('11)

## *Attacks*

- **Active Eavesdroppers:** Ebrez et. al ('11) Zafer-Agrawal-Srivatsa ('11),
- **Unauthenticated Channels:** Mathur et al. ('10), Xiao-Greenstein-Mandayam-Trappe ('07).

# Secret-Key Generation: A Systems Approach II




## Two Phase Approach:

- **Phase 1:** Channel Probing and Estimation:  $(\hat{h}_{AB}^N, \hat{h}_{BA}^N)$
- **Phase 2:** Source Reconciliation and Key Extraction

Secret-Key Generation: Capacity Limits

# Secret-Key Generation - Source Model


Maurer ('93), Ahlswede-Csiszar ('93)



- **DMMS Model:**  $(x_A^N, x_B^N) \sim \prod_{i=1}^N p_{x_A, x_B}(x_A(i), x_B(i))$
- **Interactive Public Communication:**  $\mathbf{F}$
- **Key Generation:**  $k_i = \mathcal{F}_i(x_i^N, \mathbf{F}), i \in \{A, B\}$ .
- **Reliability:**  $\Pr(k_A \neq k_B) \leq \varepsilon_N$ ,
- **Secrecy:**  $\frac{1}{N} I(k_A; \mathbf{F}) \leq \varepsilon_N$
- **Secret-Key Rate:**  $R = \frac{1}{N} H(k_A)$

# Secret-Key Generation - Source Model


Maurer ('93), Csiszar-Ahlsvede ('93)



- **Capacity:**  $C = I(x_A; x_B)$
- One-Round of Communication
- Capacity Unknown when Eavesdropper also observes a source sequence




# Problem Setup



## Two-Way Reciprocal Fading Channel

$$y_B(i) = h_{AB}(i)x_A(i) + n_{AB}(i), \quad y_A(i) = h_{BA}(i)x_B(i) + n_{BA}(i)$$
$$z_A(i) = g_A(i)x_A(i) + n_{AE}(i), \quad z_B(i) = g_B(i)x_B(i) + n_{BE}(i)$$

# Problem Setup




## Two-Way Reciprocal Fading Channel

$$y_B(i) = h_{AB}(i)x_A(i) + n_{AB}(i), \quad y_A(i) = h_{BA}(i)x_B(i) + n_{BA}(i)$$
$$z_A(i) = g_A(i)x_A(i) + n_{AE}(i), \quad z_B(i) = g_B(i)x_B(i) + n_{BE}(i)$$

### Channel Model Assumptions:

- Non-Coherent Model:  $h_{AB}(i)$  and  $h_{BA}(i)$
- Perfect Eavesdropper CSI:  $g_A(i)$  &  $g_B(i)$  known to Eve
- Block-Fading Channel with Coherence Period:  $T$ .
- Approximate Reciprocity:  $(h_{AB}, h_{BA}) \sim p_{h_{AB}, h_{BA}}(\cdot, \cdot)$
- Independence:  $(g_A, g_B) \perp (h_{AB}, h_{BA})$

# Problem Setup



## Two-Way Reciprocal Fading Channel

$$y_B(i) = h_{AB}(i)x_A(i) + n_{AB}(i), \quad y_A(i) = h_{BA}(i)x_B(i) + n_{BA}(i)$$
$$z_A(i) = g_A(i)x_A(i) + n_{AE}(i), \quad z_B(i) = g_B(i)x_B(i) + n_{BE}(i)$$

### Secret-Key Agreement Protocols:

- Interactive:  $x_A(i) = f_A(m_A, y_A^{i-1})$ ,  $x_B(i) = f_B(m_B, y_B^{i-1})$
- Average Power Constraints  $E[|x_A|^2] \leq P$ ,  $E[|x_B|^2] \leq P$ .
- $k_A = \mathcal{K}_A(y_A^N, m_A)$ ,  $k_B = \mathcal{K}_B(y_B^N, m_B)$
- Reliability and Secrecy Constraint.
- Secret-Key Capacity

- Upper Bound
- Lower Bound — With Public Discussion
- Lower Bound — No Public Discussion
- Asymptotic Regimes and Numerical Results

# Secret-Key Capacity — Upper Bound

Khisti'12

## Theorem


An upper bound on the secret-key capacity is  $C \leq R^+$ :

$$R^+ = \frac{1}{T} I(h_{AB}; h_{BA}) + \max_{P(h_{AB}) \in \mathcal{P}} E \left[ \log \left( 1 + \frac{P(h_{AB}) |h_{AB}|^2}{1 + P(h_{AB}) |g_A|^2} \right) \right] \\ + \max_{P(h_{BA}) \in \mathcal{P}} E \left[ \log \left( 1 + \frac{P(h_{BA}) |h_{BA}|^2}{1 + P(h_{BA}) |g_B|^2} \right) \right]$$

where  $P(h_{AB})$  and  $P(h_{BA})$  are power allocation function across the fading states.


# Secret-Key Capacity — Upper Bound

Genie-Aided Channel:



# Secret-Key Capacity — Upper Bound


Genie-Aided Channel:



$$NTR \leq I(m_A, h_{BA}^N, y_A^{NT}; m_B, h_{AB}^N, y_B^{NT} | \mathbf{z}^{NT}, \mathbf{g}^N)$$

# Secret-Key Capacity — Upper Bound

Genie-Aided Channel:




$$\begin{aligned} NTR &\leq I(m_A, h_{BA}^N, y_A^{NT}; m_B, h_{AB}^N, y_B^{NT} | \mathbf{z}^{NT}, \mathbf{g}^N) \\ &\leq I(x_A(NT); y_B(NT) | h_{AB}(N), z_A(NT), \mathbf{g}_A(N)) \\ &\quad + I(x_B(NT); y_A(NT) | h_{BA}(N), z_B(NT), \mathbf{g}_B(N)) \\ &\quad + I(m_A, h_{BA}^N, y_A^{NT-1}; m_B, h_{AB}^N, y_B^{NT-1} | \mathbf{z}^{NT-1}, \mathbf{g}^N) \end{aligned}$$



# Secret-Key Capacity — Upper Bound


Genie-Aided Channel:



$$\begin{aligned} NTR &\leq I(m_A, h_{BA}^N, y_A^{NT}; m_B, h_{AB}^N, y_B^{NT} | \mathbf{z}^{NT}, \mathbf{g}^N) \\ &\leq \sum_{n=1}^{NT} I(x_A(n); y_B(n) | \bar{h}_{AB}(n), z_A(n), \bar{g}_A(n)) \\ &\quad + \sum_{n=1}^{NT} I(x_B(n); y_A(n) | \bar{h}_{BA}(n), z_B(n), \bar{g}_B(n)) \\ &\quad + NI(h_{AB}; h_{BA}) \end{aligned}$$

# Secret-Key Capacity — Upper Bound

Genie-Aided Channel:




Interpretation of the Upper Bound:

- Channel Reciprocity:  $\frac{1}{T} I(h_{AB}; h_{BA})$
- **Forward Channel:**  $I(y_B; x_A | h_{AB}, z_A, g_A)$
- **Reverse Channel:**  $I(y_A; x_B | h_{BA}, z_B, g_B)$

# Secret-Key Capacity — Upper Bound

Genie-Aided Channel:




Interpretation of the Upper Bound:

- Channel Reciprocity:  $\frac{1}{T} I(h_{AB}; h_{BA})$
- **Forward Channel:**  $I(y_B; x_A | h_{AB}, z_A, g_A)$
- **Reverse Channel:**  $I(y_A; x_B | h_{BA}, z_B, g_B)$

Upper Bound also holds if a public discussion channel is available.

# Lower Bound: Separation Based Scheme


Khisti '12



- **Training:**  $x_A(i, 1) = \sqrt{P_1}$
- **Randomness Sharing:**  $x_A(i, t) \sim \mathcal{CN}(0, P_2)$  for  $t = 2, \dots, T$   
 $\mathbf{x}_A(i) = [x_A(i, 2), \dots, x_A(i, T)] \in \mathbb{C}^{T-1}$ .
- **Training:**  $\hat{h}_{AB}(i)$  and  $\hat{h}_{BA}(i)$
- **Correlated Sources:**  
Forward Channel:  $\mathbf{y}_B(i) = h_{AB}(i)\mathbf{x}_A(i) + \mathbf{n}_B(i) \in \mathbb{C}^{T-1}$ ,  
Reverse Channel:  $\mathbf{y}_A(i) = h_{BA}(i)\mathbf{x}_B(i) + \mathbf{n}_A(i) \in \mathbb{C}^{T-1}$ .

# Lower Bound: Separation Based Scheme


Khisti '12



	$A$	$B$	$E$
Channel State	$\hat{h}_{BA}^K$	$\hat{h}_{AB}^K$	$(g_A^K, g_B^K)$
Forward Channel	$\mathbf{x}_A^K$	$\mathbf{y}_B^K$	$\mathbf{z}_A^K$
Reverse Channel	$\mathbf{y}_A^K$	$\mathbf{x}_B^K$	$\mathbf{z}_B^K$

# Lower Bound: Separation Based Scheme


Khisti '12



	$A$	$B$	$E$
Channel State	$\hat{h}_{BA}^K$	$\hat{h}_{AB}^K$	$(\mathbf{g}_A^K, \mathbf{g}_B^K)$
Forward Channel	$\mathbf{x}_A^K$	$\mathbf{y}_B^K$	$\mathbf{z}_A^K$
Reverse Channel	$\mathbf{y}_A^K$	$\mathbf{x}_B^K$	$\mathbf{z}_B^K$

Generate a secret-key from these sequences.

# Lower Bound — Overview



# Achievable Rate with Public Discussion

## Theorem (Public Discussion)

*An achievable rate when a public discussion channel is available is*

$$R_{\text{key}} = \left\{ \begin{aligned} & \frac{1}{T} \underbrace{I(\hat{h}_{AB}; \hat{h}_{BA})}_{\text{Training}} \\ & + \frac{T-1}{T} \underbrace{\left[ I(y_B; x_A, \hat{h}_{AB}) - I(y_B; z_A, g_A, h_{AB}) \right]}_{\text{Forward Channel}} \\ & + \frac{T-1}{T} \underbrace{\left[ I(y_A; x_B, \hat{h}_{BA}) - I(y_A; z_B, g_B, h_{BA}) \right]}_{\text{Reverse Channel}} \end{aligned} \right\}$$



# Achievable Rate with Public Discussion

## Theorem (Public Discussion)

*An achievable rate when a public discussion channel is available is*

$$R_{\text{key}} = \left\{ \underbrace{\frac{1}{T} I(\hat{h}_{AB}; \hat{h}_{BA})}_{\text{Training}} + \underbrace{\frac{T-1}{T} \left[ I(y_B; x_A, \hat{h}_{AB}) - I(y_B; z_A, g_A, h_{AB}) \right]}_{\text{Forward Channel}} + \underbrace{\frac{T-1}{T} \left[ I(y_A; x_B, \hat{h}_{BA}) - I(y_A; z_B, g_B, h_{BA}) \right]}_{\text{Reverse Channel}} \right\}$$

## Theorem

*In the high SNR regime our upper and lower bound (with public discussion) coincide:*


$$\lim_{P \rightarrow \infty} \left\{ R^+(P) - R_{\text{PD}}^-(P) \right\} \leq \frac{c}{T}$$

where

$$c = E \left[ \log \left( 1 + \frac{|h_{AB}|^2}{|g_A|^2} \right) \right] + E \left[ \log \left( 1 + \frac{|h_{BA}|^2}{|g_B|^2} \right) \right]$$

# Lower Bound


Without Public Discussion



Phase	Coherence Blocks
Probing + Randomness Sharing	$K$
Channel-Sequence Reconciliation	$\epsilon_1 \cdot K$
Source-Sequence Reconciliation	$\epsilon_2 \cdot K$

# Numerical Plot

SNR = 35 dB,  $h_1, h_2 \sim \mathcal{CN}(0, 1)$ ,  $\rho = 0.99$ .



# Symmetric MIMO Extension

M. Andersson, A. Khisti and M. Skoglund, 2012

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbf{y}_B &= \mathbf{H}_{AB}\mathbf{x}_A + \mathbf{n}_{AB}, & \mathbf{z}_A &= \mathbf{G}_{AE}\mathbf{x}_A + \mathbf{n}_{AE} \\ \mathbf{y}_A &= \mathbf{H}_{BA}\mathbf{x}_B + \mathbf{n}_{BA}, & \mathbf{z}_B &= \mathbf{G}_{BE}\mathbf{x}_B + \mathbf{n}_{BE}\end{aligned}$$

- $\mathbf{H}_A, \mathbf{H}_B \in \mathbb{C}^{M \times M}$ ,  $\mathbf{G}_{AE}, \mathbf{G}_{BE} \in \mathbb{C}^{N_E \times M}$
- Independent Rayleigh Fading, Approximate Reciprocity
- Block Fading with Coherence Period  $T$
- $T \geq M \geq N_E$

Training + Source Emulation achieves degrees of freedom given by:

$$d = \max_{M^* \in [1, M]} 2 \frac{(T - M^*)(M^* - N_E)}{T}$$

- Secret-Key Agreement in Two-Way fading channels
- Upper and Lower Bounds on Capacity
- Asymptotic Optimality
- Significant Gains over Training Based Schemes


## Future Work:

- Upper Bounds with Perfect Reciprocity (See Also Lai-Liang-Poor '12)
- Stationary Fading Channels
- Low SNR Regime
- Stronger Eavesdropper Channels

# Error Reconciliation

## Public Discussion Channel, Discrete-Valued Sequences

### Reconciliation of Channel-Estimate Sequences $(\hat{h}_{AB}^K, \hat{h}_{BA}^K)$




$$\frac{1}{K}H(\phi_A) \approx H(\hat{h}_{AB}^K | \hat{h}_{BA}^K), \quad \frac{1}{K}H(\phi_B) \approx H(\hat{h}_{BA}^K | \hat{h}_{AB}^K)$$


# Error Reconciliation

## Public Discussion Channel, Discrete-Valued Sequences

### Reconciliation of Channel-Estimate Sequences $(\hat{h}_{AB}^K, \hat{h}_{BA}^K)$



### Reconciliation of $(\mathbf{y}_A^K, \mathbf{y}_B^K)$



$$\frac{1}{TK} H(\psi_A) \approx H(y_A | x_B, \hat{h}_{AB}, \hat{h}_{BA}), \quad \frac{1}{TK} H(\psi_B) \approx H(y_B | x_A, \hat{h}_{AB}, \hat{h}_{BA})$$